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Military Might and Political, Economic, and Social Institutions:
A Global Time Series Empirical Test of Terrorism
Jibey Asthappan, American University
Introduction
Current U.S. counter-terrorism policy deals with terrorists in a somewhat rational fashion.
However, the ideology of terrorists has been characterized in a U.S. Government report as
involving “oppression, violence, and hate” 1 . These ambiguous terms share text with more
specific irrational reasons for terrorist activities. In the same report, experts state that terrorists
hold “a false belief that the United States is the cause of most problems affecting Muslims today,
our enemies seek to expel Western power and influence from the Muslim world and establish
regimes that rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam”2. Furthermore, the
report continues by stating “[f]or our terrorist enemies, violence is not only justified, it is
necessary and even glorified – judged the only means to achieve a world vision darkened by
hate, fear and oppression”3. Moreover, they describe terrorists as having a “distorted and violent
view of the world”4.
If policy were derived from the above phrases, which depict an irrational terrorist foe, our
military, local law enforcement, and security organizations may have to alter operations to
combat these groups. Yet despite the seemingly irrational drive depicted by the United States,
our policies reflect a rational actor possibly funded by a rational state. It may be that terrorist
groups are rational and have rational reasons for their conflict with the United States. But even if
their reasons are rational, that does not mean terrorist beliefs are justified or correct. The United
States has an interest in overcoming these opponents because they are a threat to Americans and
possibly the world. Therefore, accepting terrorists as enemies is justified, but accepting them as
irrational enemies is not.
Counter-terrorism policy in a democracy is plagued by one ailment: security and personal
freedom are opposing needs5. Citizens expect terrorists to be dissuaded from attacking innocent
civilians if civil society can implement security measures that prevent terrorists from planning
and implementing an event. Simultaneously, sectors of the military, the government, and society
want to punish terrorists. Citizens want the terrorists permanently stopped and the planning of
future attacks prevented. This creates tension between due process, individual rights, and
general security because the most effective methods of attaining security are often the most
personally intrusive methods. This constrains counter-terrorism policy and belabors civil rights6.
Jibey Asthappan is a Ph.D. candidate in American University’s Justice, Law and Society program. Six years of
military service in the field of counter-terrorism is the impetus for his research and his drive to inspire effective
counter-terrorism policy.
1
Whitehouse (2006). “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. “September 2006 available at http://www.
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2
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3
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4
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Under such constraints facilities, such as the Guantanamo Bay, become necessary in order to
protect citizens.
Free from law designed to prosecute far different criminals, these facilities are criticized
for their lack of prisoner civil rights. Designed for simply prosecution of terrorists, these centers
also become the center of complex legal matters. For example, not all detainees desire to return
to their country. Uighur Muslims from a North-West province of China do not wish to return to
China for fear of retribution. Reports insist that these detainees, if released in China, will face
torture and/or death. Although eligible to apply for asylum in the United States, these detainees
have not expressed desire for refuge. Instead the U.S. has been forced to maintain their detainee
status and allow these Muslims to habitat in Guantanamo until provisions have been made7. This
example highlights the need for counter-terrorism policy to do more than address the symptoms
of terrorism; future policy must focus on preventing terrorism. If policy fails to identify and
remedy root causes of terrorism the future is likely to have increasing numbers of complex civil
rights and legal dilemmas.
This study, in an effort to uncover root reasons for terrorism, will delve into the issue of
terrorism by testing if economic, social, and political factors have an effect on terrorism. It is the
intention of this study to suggest policies that address the source of terrorist motivations rather
than the symptoms. Using data from RAND and the World Bank that spans 12 years 8 , the
researcher uses a negative binomial time series analysis to answer several hypotheses probing the
relationship of political, social, and economic institutions’ effect on terrorist incidents.
Establishing that terrorism is a rational behavior is significant to the discussion; it is only
when we prove that terrorism is rational that policy can be effective. That is, if terrorism is
irrational, counter-terrorism policy will be ineffective. Therefore, this article will begin with a
discussion about the rationality of terrorism. Previous research will then be reviewed that
attempts to measure the effect of political, social and economic factors. Weaknesses and
strengths of each study will be discussed. The current study will then be introduced including
methodology, data and findings. Finally, the discussion and conclusion will highlight important
findings of the study and suggest policy implications.
Terrorists as Rational Actors
Simply stated, rational choice theory purports that “crimes are broadly the result of
rational choices based on analyses of anticipated costs and benefits” 9 . Therefore, in this
proposal’s application, terrorists seek to reduce costs and maximize the benefits. The costs for a
terrorist may be the group or team’s apprehension prior to the incident, a premature detonation,
the target’s survival, or the community’s backlash. The benefits could be incapacitating
governments, defeating repression, killing a person or group, and/or publicizing their cause.
Terrorists may also attempt to overthrow a government, such as bandits had done in China.
7

Simard, Kara “ Innocent at Guantanamo Bay: Granting Political Asylum to Unlawfully Detained Uighur
Muslims.” Suffolk Transnational Law Review 30:2 (2007)
8
Data acquired from RAND’s MIPT terrorism knowledgebase and the World Bank. Data from 1995 to 2006 are
utilized in this study.
9
Cornish, D. B. C., Ronald V. "Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for Research and Policy." An Annual
Review of Research 6: 145-185, p.vi. (1985)
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To illustrate the rationale of terrorists, Zwinkael recognized three characteristics of Al
Qaeda that demonstrate a certain level of rationality. First, all the operations by Al Qaeda
exemplify “uniqueness”10 in that each attack is distinct from any other in history. Second, each
attack strictly adhered to a timeline. Third, Al Qaeda had defined goals. Moreover, Zwikael
applied a Project Management methodology to test terrorist events. He found that 44 processes
of project management were met in Al Qaeda operations. Grouped into 9 categories, this list
exemplifies the extensive planning needed for a successful attack 11 . The categories are as
follows:
1. Integration. Includes integrative processes required to ensure that the various
elements of the project are properly coordinated.
2. Scope. This knowledge area makes sure that the project includes all and only
the necessary work required to complete the project successfully. This knowledge
area includes product scope (features and functions that are to be included in a
product or service) and project scope (work that must be done in order to deliver a
product as specified).
3. Time. Scheduling is the process of integrating information regarding duration
of activities, precedence relationships, and required due dates, in order to
determine the dates in which resources are to perform the various activities that
are part of the project.
4. Cost. Processes include planning and controlling the project budget.
5. Quality. Processes performed to reach the totality of features and characteristics
of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy a customer’s given needs.
6. Human resources. Processes required making effective use of the people
involved in the project, including organizational planning, staff acquisition, and
team development.
7. Communications. The processes required in order to assure the timely and
appropriate generation, collection, dissemination, storage, and ultimate
disposition of project information. This knowledge area includes communications
planning, information distribution, performance reporting, and administrative
closure.
8. Risk management. Processes dealing with identifying and reducing the
project’s risk level, including risk management planning, risk identification,
qualitative risk analysis, quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning, and
risk monitoring and control.
9. Procurement. Processes require the acquisition of goods and services from
outside the performing organization. This knowledge area includes: procurement

10
11

Zwinkael, O. "Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." Comparative Politics 23(4): 423-438, p.268. (2007)
Ibid.
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planning, solicitation planning, solicitation,
administration, and contract closeout12.

source

selection,

contract

The characteristics above give strong reasons to believe that Al Qaeda does act as rationally as
any large corporation or business acts. The fatwa of February 1998 stated that “it was God’s
decree that every Muslim should try his utmost to kill any American, military or civilian,
anywhere in the world, because of American occupation of Islam’s holy places and general
aggression against Muslims”13 . This decree issued by Al Qaeda may seem irrational to the
average American, but the steps to accomplish the fatwa are well developed. In fact, operations
are so well developed that from 1993 to 2005, a majority of Al Qaeda’s attacks on the U.S. could
be considered successful14.
Crenshaw found that terrorists use “rational political choice”15. The actions of terrorists
are to gain “recognition or attention”16 for their cause. Gruesome and horrific events bring the
greatest attention and are therefore the tools of these actors. Crenshaw found that when a small
group is faced with a seemingly insurmountable task of challenging a large group or nation,
terrorist tactics are logical choices17.
Ferracuti 18 examines four theories to explain terrorism: frustration-aggression,
unbalanced social systems, Olson’s rational choice, and Marxist theory.
Ferracuti does
understand how logical actors could commit terrorist acts, yet he found that all four theories fall
short of explaining terrorism. Instead, he found that subculture theory holds the greatest
explanatory power19. Although Ferracuti does not support rational choice, he does explain how
certain death can still be a rational choice for a terrorist. It is understood that a human’s natural
survival instinct would prohibit a person from putting himself in danger, but exceptions to this
human drive may explain why terrorists logically kill others and themselves20. Ferracuti states,
“[d]eath per se cannot be accepted at the experimental level and must therefore be rationalized,
attributed to chance or to natural processes, made into a symbol of an exceptional event, or
denied and lived simply as a religious transition from life on earth to eternal life”21. During
times of war, a soldier can be encouraged to murder and understand that his or her life is in
jeopardy. A terrorist, therefore, creates these war conditions and subjects himself or herself to
this rule. No longer is the terrorist killing or being killed; instead he is part of a collective action
against an enemy22.
Although this is by no means an exhaustive literature review of rational choice theory’s
application to terrorism, it does provide evidence that the theory can be applied to terrorism. To
follow Ferracuti’s logic, a U.S. soldier would certainly not be considered irrational; therefore,
12

Ibid, p. 269.
Ibid, p. 270.
14
Ibid.
15
Crenshaw, M. "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13(4): 379-399 (1981)
16
Ibid, p.285.
17
Ibid.
18
Ferracuti, F. "A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism." The Annals of the American Academy: 129-140.
(1982)
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid, p.136.
22
Ibid.
13
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terrorist actors may be rational as well. Following Crenshaw’s 23 findings, not only are the
individual terrorist actors rational, but the group is as well because it is the only viable means of
combating a superpower such as the United States. Not only are the groups’ motivations
rational, but the means they use are rationally executed24.
Previous Research
Previous empirical research has shaped the current study. Davis 25 tests two major
theories in terrorism research utilizing political, social and economic factors: social
disorganization theory and relative deprivation theory. Both theories hinge on rational choice
theory’s postulates. Davis argues that social disorganization will be positively related to societal
change. He operationalizes societal change using two variables GDP growth and population
growth which estimate economic and social change, respectively. These variables are expected
to be positively related to political violence. Evidence supporting relative deprivation theory,
Davis argues, is manifested when GDP per capita is regressed on political violence. This
relationship is not expected to be linear; instead, it was projected to have an inverted “U” shape.
The logic for such a relationship is based on the argument of Gurr 26 and the findings of
Feirabend and Feirabend27 who found that as moderate levels of GDP per capita are related to
high political violence whereas low levels of political violence were associated with low and
very high GDP per capita values. As is necessary to test inverted “U” relationships, Davis
utilized interaction variables to test relative deprivation theory. Political rights squared, civil
rights squared and democracy squared were used to test the hypothesis that repression and
political rights share a negative parabolic curve. In addition, variables calculated by squaring
GDP per capita, education divided by GDP per capita, political rights multiplied by GDP per
capita, and political rights multiplied by education further test relative deprivation theory.
To test each theory Davis used count data of the number of assassinations per million per
year in 138 nations over the course of 15 years (1970-1984), pooled and broken up into three
time periods as a dependent variable. Control variables of each nation included average
education level, fraction of time (1960-1985) in war, participation in war (dummy), political
rights, civil rights, democracy, government consumption, and government expenditures relative
to GDP.
Models testing social disorganization theory found results contradictory to the theory.
Yet models testing rational choice theory, a negative relationship between real GDP per capita
growth and political violence, were significant. In fact, when the dependent variable included all
15 years, the p value was significant to the 1% level. As predicted, results support an inverted
“U”-shaped relationship between political violence and repression. That is, political violence
was low when repression was low and very high, but violence was greatest when repression was
23

Crenshaw, M. "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13(4): 379-399 (1981)
Zwinkael, O. "Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities." Comparative Politics 23(4): 423-438. (2007)
25
Davis, G. G. “Repression, Rationality, and Relative Deprivation; A Theoretical and Emperical Examination of
Cross-National Variations in Political Violence” Department of Economics Washington, D.C. , George Mason
University Ph.D. : 1-31.(1999)
26
Gurr, R. T. Why Men Rebel. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970)
27
Feirabend, R. & Feirabend, I. "Aggressive Behavior within Polities 1946-62 a Cross-National Study." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 10: 249-271.(1966)
24
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neither high nor low. All models testing this relationship had a p value below 7%. When all
years were considered, the p-value was below the 0.1% level, indicating a very strong
relationship28. Overall, the study found support for the application for rational choice theory and
relative deprivation theory. Moreover, this study introduced variables that will be included in the
current study.
Crain & Crain29 conducted a study in an effort to test the effect of terrorism on economic
factors. Data included indicators from 147 nations between the years of 1968 and 2002.
Regressions used several dependent variables including GDP per capita, fixed capital
investment, final consumption expenditures, and international tourist expenditures. The
independent variables were unanticipated incidents per 100,000 population, incidents per
100,000, unanticipated casualties per 100,000, casualties per 100,000, unanticipated wounded
per 100,000, wounded per 100,000, unanticipated killed per 100,000, and killed per 100,000. All
terrorist incident data were acquired through the ITERATE database. Control variables were
also included in a set of regressions. They included infrastructure and economic indicators. All
independent variables were calculated using their natural log30.
The results found that terrorism is quite costly. Consistently, unanticipated incidents per
100,000 people were significant. Most regressions found anticipated incidents per 100,000
people were significant. The impact on GDP was dramatic for some nations. For instance, if the
U.S. decreased the number of incidents from 3 to 2, the savings would be $40 billion. Other
nations would not see such a dramatic change. For example, Argentina would save $257 million
if terrorist incidents decreased from 11 to 10. Interestingly, the change in cost from the number
of incidents was not uniform. For example, a population of 10 million that experiences a
decrease in incidents from 2 to 1 will see a savings of $2.2 billion. But if the same sized nation
decreases the number of incidents from 10 to 9, the savings is only $330 million. The population
of the nation will also dictate the magnitude of the change in GDP. The larger the nation, the
greater the effect terrorism has on GDP31. Crain & Crain offer valuable information about the
relationship terrorism has on economic factors. In particular, terrorist incidents play a role in a
nation’s economic well being. This study also introduces one particularly interesting control
variable: telephone mainlines. In every regression it was used, it was significant at the 1%
level32, leading this researcher to consider this variable’s effect on a nation’s economy.
Abadie33 conducted a study to measure the effect economic, political, cultural/religious,
and environmental variables have on the risk of terrorist attacks. To accomplish this, Abadie
(2004) utilized data from the World Market Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index which
included information on 186 nations. These data served as the dependent variable. Notable
independent variables included GDP per capita (log), lack of political rights, linguistic
fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, country’s land area,
country’s elevation, and country’s tropical area. Abadie chose political rights instead of civil

28

Davis, G. G. “Repression, Rationality and Relative Deprivation” (1999)
Crain, N. V. & Crain, W. M. "Terrorized Economies " Public Choice 128: 317-349. (2006)
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Abadie, A. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism” Working Paper Series rwp04-043, Harvard
University John F. Kennedy School of Government.(2004)
29
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rights to reduce the endogeneity the variable would have on the risk of terrorism, i.e., a nation
may constrict civil rights to deter terrorism.
Results of and ordinary least squares regression indicate that when the linguistic
fractionalization variable is included, GDP per capita loses significance (negative correlation).
Therefore, the commonly held belief that poor nations are more prone to terrorism is refuted in
this study34. In addition, all three environmental variables (land area, elevation, and tropical
area) were significant, indicating that geographical conditions may lead to terrorist incident risk.
Abadie found the relationship between terrorist risk and lack of political rights to increase until a
moderate level of political rights is reached; then risk decreases. This is in accordance with
Davis’ (n.d.) findings. Abadie’s use of environmental factors influences the current study.
The following studies utilize similar dependent and independent variables. The first, by
Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen 35 consisted of four hypotheses expecting a
negative relationship between terrorism incidents and economic freedom, political freedom,
political rights, and civil liberties.
Hypothesis 1: Higher degrees of economic freedom lead to less terrorism
Hypothesis 2: Higher degrees of political freedom lead to less terrorism
Hypothesis 3: More extensive political rights lead to less terrorism
Hypothesis 4: More civil liberties lead to less terrorism
The researchers used a Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) design that spanned the years
of 1996 and 2002. Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen used ITERATE recorded
terrorist incidents by origin nation and target nation as dependent variables. Independent
variables included political rights, civil rights, GDP per capita, economic growth, human
poverty, and a set of control variables. The dependent variable was coded as those nations that
had experienced a terrorist incident and those that had not. This variable served as the dependent
dummy variable (1=nations having terrorist incidents, 0=nation that did not have terrorist
incidents), therefore, a logistic regression model was utilized. Independent variables were
compiled from the Economic Freedom of the World Index and Freedom House.
Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen found that negative quadratic form
explained the relationship between terrorism and democracy (sig. at .01 level). Therefore,
nations having little democracy and those having the most democracy enjoyed fewer terrorist
incidents, whereas, those that had a moderate amount of democracy faced a greater likelihood of
a terrorist event. Furthermore, a negative relationship was found between civil liberties and
terrorist attacks. Those nations that allowed greater amounts of civil liberties had a reduced
likelihood of terrorism. Results also discovered a negative relationship between trade orientation
and terrorist events, as well as a positive relationship between linguistic fracturalization and
terrorist acts.
34

Ibid.
Kurrild-Kiltgaard, P., Justesen, M. K., and Klemmensen " The Political Economy of Freedom, Democracy, and
Transnational Terrorism." Public Choice 128: 286-315.(2006)
35
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Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen, and Klemmensen examined the origin of terrorist
groups/individuals. Utilizing the terrorist’s origin as a dependent variable, democracy was found
to be a significant independent variable. This relationship was negative and linear, i.e., nations
that were more democratic had a lower likelihood of producing terrorists. When control
variables were added, civil liberty became significant and negatively related to nations
experiencing terrorist incidents. Essentially, democracy and civil liberty were found to be the
strongest predictors of terrorist acts (whether victim or perpetrator). Economic freedom was not
significantly related to nations experiencing terrorist attacks or those in which the terrorists
originated. Utilizing many of the same independent variables, the current study attempts to test
military force’s effect using more sophisticated models.
Li conducted a study that also utilized time series analysis (TSCS) of terrorist incidents
(ITERATE) from 1975 to 1997 from 119 nations. Three hypotheses are tested and are as
follows:
Hypothesis 1: Greater democratic participation reduces the number of
transnational terrorist incidents in a country.
Hypothesis 2: Countries with more institutional constraints on their government
experience more transnational terrorist incidents.
Hypothesis 3: Democratic countries with the proportional system have fewer
transnational terrorist incidents than those with the majoritarian or mixed
systems36.
As mentioned, the dependent variable was terrorist incidents. The independent variables
included freedom of press, democratic participation (dummy), government power constraint,
proportional government, regime durability [“number of years since most recent regime
change”37], past incidents (average number of incidents since 1968), and post-cold war (if nation
arose after the cold war). Also included were controls for regions, government size, and conflict
(if nation was involved in a conflict).
Results indicated that democratic participation reduces terrorist incidents and government
constraints increase the likelihood for terrorist incidents. Li concludes by stating that “improving
citizen satisfaction, electoral participation, and political efficacy, democratic governments can
reduce the number of terrorist incidents within their borders”38. Of interest to this study is, of
course, the major finding as reported, but also the use of proportional dummy variables. The
suspected negative effect of a proportional system was not found in any of the models tested. In
one of two models majoritarian and mixed systems were found to have a positive effect on
terrorist incidents.
Research Design: Measures, Data, and Methods
36

Li, Q. "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?" Journal of Conflict Resolution
49(2): 1-20.(2005)
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid, p.17.
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Similar to Li’s study, the current study utilizes the number of terrorist incidents per
country per year in 166 nations between the years of 1995 and 2006 as the dependent variable.
Li addressed the use of count data by arguing that such data does not take into account the
magnitude of the incident. That is, a terrorist incident that kills 30 people would be considered
the same as an incident that does not kill one person39. Such a consideration would seriously
threaten internal validity if the magnitude were related to the independent variables and the
purpose of the analysis. In this case, the magnitude is not central to the argument, instead, it is
the fact that the individual or group planned and executed the terrorist event. From a deterrence
standpoint, the fact that the terrorist(s) conspired to commit the attack is of concern. Economic,
political, and social factors should have prevented a person from feeling that such behavior was
necessary. In addition, the ubiquitous nature of “military might” should have dissuaded the
perpetrator or group from following through with the plan. This analysis goes beyond the
“symptoms” of terrorism by trying to measure the source of terrorist drives. Therefore, treating
all incidents as equivalent may be considered the best method to ascertain the source of terrorist
drives. According to University of Maryland’s START program, 97% of terrorist incidents are
domestic40. Therefore, aggregate analysis of this kind can, for the most part, accurately estimate
the effect of economic, political and social factors on terrorism. In addition, military force is
largely domestic with only a few exceptions; for example the coordinated effort in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In essence, only a small fraction of nations possess the ability to substantially fight
terrorism abroad.
The current study introduces military force to determine if it does prevent terrorist events.
Testing such a proposition may seem problematic because determining causation is difficult. In
addition, nations who dedicate military resources to terrorism innately have an interest in
deterring terrorists. Therefore, events that occur on their soil may have occurred regardless of
military efforts. Furthermore, military force may decrease terrorism for a nation that otherwise
would have many more incidents. Admittedly, these relationships complicate the current study,
but each will be addressed and mitigated as much as possible.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In accordance with the aforementioned literature, the following research question and
hypotheses have been established.
Research Question: Can the economic, social and political institutions affect the likelihood of a
terrorist event in a nation?
Hypothesis 1: Nations that enjoy more economic freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to
terrorist incidents.
Hypothesis 2: Nations that enjoy more political freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to
terrorist incidents.
Hypothesis 3: A state’s military spending will have a negative effect on terrorism incidents in
that respective state.

39
40

Ibid.
START, University of Maryland’s terrorism database

Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies, Summer 2009, Vol. 4, No. 2, p1-23

9

Military Might and Political, Economic, and Social Institutions

Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of a state’s military workforce is negatively related to the number
of terrorist incidents
Hypothesis 5: Nations having a majoritarian or mixed political system will be positively related
to the number of terrorist incidents
Data
This study will use count data of terrorist incidents for the years including and between
1995 and 2006 gathered from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base41. For instance, in FY 2000,
Ecuador experienced five terrorist incidents. Therefore, Ecuador is given a five in 2000. To
avoid auto-correlation, the time series data will include a trend variable. Using count data
precludes the use of OLS because a great number of nations did not experience terrorist
incidents. For example, China did not experience any terrorist incidents 4 out of 12 years.
Furthermore, the data is not parametric nor are the conditional means and variances equal as a
Poisson model assumes. Therefore, a time series Negative Binomial Regression Model
(XTNBRM) is utilized.
Definition
A major concern when dealing with terrorism data is the definition applied to an incident.
The FBI, State Department, and CIA all have different definitions. Using a singular definition
can be considered a strength as well as a weakness. Certain incidents may not fit the needed
parameters, yet they are considered by many to be terrorism. On the other hand, an innocuous
incident may be considered terrorism even though it may seem ridiculous to be considered as
such. The data utilized in this study does not have a set definition. Instead MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Base used several configurable definitions of terrorist. This approach is ambiguous
but is likely to be one of the most liberal. It is necessary to mention that one should not consider
these data to be completely accurate but rather a close approximation of the number of incidents.
Data from any source of this kind will most likely be inaccurate because the chain of events that
must occur to have an incident added to this list is daunting at times. Incidents such as 9/11 will
easily make the list, but incidents that are in remote areas, affected few people, and did not result
in fatalities will most likely be neglected. Yet this data does provide valuable information that
represents terrorism in many regions of the world; even if the count is not correct, the magnitude
still reflects the degree of terrorism. In addition, the error is considered to be close to equivalent
in most nations, therefore the data are still reliable because the error is distributed evenly
throughout. Furthermore, this type of data are considered one of the most accurate non-classified
sources.
To measure military force several variables will be introduced into the regression. The
following will operationalize the variable: military expenditures as a percentage of central
government spending, military spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
military personnel as a percentage of labor force, and total military personnel. Data for this
variable was gathered from the World Bank42. Although data from this report are valuable, some
41
42

RAND’s MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase
The World Bank Database
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variables may be considered problematic under this type of examination because not all military
funds are directed toward counter-terrorism. Yet attaining a figure that could accurately measure
counter-terrorism spending would be equally problematic. For instance, in the United States
many agencies, including Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigations,
Central Intelligence Agency, and many others, participate in conjunction with and independently
from the U.S. military to prevent terrorist events. Finding accurate counter-terrorism figures in
an immensely bureaucratic nation such as the U.S. is difficult, but the data become increasingly
more difficult in less bureaucratic and less organized nations such as Zimbabwe. Therefore, the
percentage of GDP dedicated to military spending and military expenditures as a percentage of
central government expenditures should be considered more as an indicator of counter-terrorism
spending than as an exact figure. Furthermore, in effort to neutralize the disparity of spending
between first world and third world nations, military expenditures are held respective to GDP
and central government spending. For example, the United States spent approximately
$348,500,000 in military expenditures in 2004; meanwhile, Israel spent a seemingly dismal
$9,900,000 in the same year43. When the percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures is
evaluated, it becomes apparent that Israel (9.7%) put more of their potential resources toward
military spending; in fact, nearly three times as much of their GDP as the United States (3.3%).
Interestedly, China spent approximately the same as the U.S. when spending is held respective of
GDP, 2.7%, but in a standardized currency value 44 China spent only 2.2% of what the U.S.
spent45.
In addition, several variables were gathered from the Heritage Foundation Freedom
index46. Those included are democracy score, business freedom, trade freedom, government
size, monetary freedom, fiscal freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights,
freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. Several other variables were gathered from World
Bank 47 . These variables include GDP growth, internet users per 100 people, labor force
participation (%), life expectancy rate, mobile users per 100 people, the social contribution as a
percentage of government revenue, and total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Two notable
controls are mobile phone and internet users. Crain & Crain used telephone mainlines as a
control48. Thus, this study will utilize internet and mobile phone user variables in an attempt to
ascertain the connectivity of a nation with itself and the rest of the world. A control of this type
should account for a nation’s technological prowess and, is therefore, a valuable control in
today’s world.
A variable for political representation has also been added. Proportional representation
(PR) systems have been regarded as more stable than mixed or majoritarian systems because
they allow societies having more fractionalization to be more accurately represented in their
government49. If this is true, political groups in non-PR systems may not be able to represent the
variety of perspectives available in their society. This frustration may lead to groups becoming
43

Chamberlin, J.” Comparisons of U.S. and Foreign Military Spending: Data from Selected Public Sources,”
Congressional Research Service 1-27.(2004)
44
Based on 2004 U.S. dollars
45
Ibid
46
The Freedom House organization; www.freedomhouse.org
47
The World Bank organization
48
Crain, N. V. & Crain, W. M. "Terrorized Economies" Public Choice 128: 317-349.(2006)
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deviant terrorist groups. Li found that PR systems did not have a significant (positive or
negative) effect on terrorist incidents, but he did find a significant positive relationship between
mixed and majoritarian systems on such incidents. Therefore, in an effort to test Li’s (2005)
findings, which included incidents from 1975 to 1997, the current study will include a dummy
variable for mixed or majoritarian systems.
The following analysis also includes a control variable for each of the 166 nations
measured in an effort to limit the effects of certain regions’ terrorist incidents, but most will drop
out due to collinearity. That is, due to the other control variables, these nation control variables
will drop out of the regression. The strength of the other control variables is negatively related to
the number of nation control variables. Table 1 represents the descriptive statistics for the
aforementioned independent and dependent variables.
Table 1: Descriptive
statistics______________________________________________________
N
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
______________________________________________________________________________
Terrorist incidents
1980 9.915657
108.7231
0
3968
Military Spending as % of GPD
1673 2.306515
1.882327
0
14.62
Military Spending as % of Total
Government Expenditures
893
9.486954
7.851437
0
52.99
Military Personnel as % of Total
Labor
1884 1.730663
1.907425
0
12.96
Military Personnel
1897 193977.4
466947.6
0
5564000
Military Personnel (log)
1887 10.70527
1.841411
4.60 15.53183
Democracy
1807 58.45977
12.22915
4
90.5
Business Freedom
1807 64.0399
14.41582
0
100
Trade Freedom
1807 62.26209
17.3811
-20
90
Fiscal Freedom
1807 68.42928
16.59099
0
99.9
Government Size
1807 65.41942
25.12799
0
99.3
Monetary Freedom
1807 70.28019
20.44035
0
95.4
Investment Freedom
1807 53.44217
19.09047
10
90
Financial Freedom
1807 50.71389
20.78177
10
90
Property Rights
1807 51.13448
23.70189
10
90
Freedom from Corruption
1807 40.0321
24.75267
4
100
GDP Growth
1903 4.371597
5.506038
-41.3
85.9
Internet Users per 100
1882 9.635659
15.53442
0
85.65
Life Expectancy
1291 68.55324
10.46541
31.08 82.32
Mobile Users per 100
1957 21.57189
30.41572
0
139.01
Population 14 or younger (%)
1973 31.47396
10.48343 13.57 51.16
Population Growth
1973 188.8121
685.0028
1.45 6580.71
Population Density
1972 1.436922
1.277803 -5.14
9.76
Governmental Social Contribution
696 20.7182
15.14373
0
60.23
Mixed or Majoritarian (dummy)
1980 .7262626
.4459884
0
1
______________________________________________________________________________
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According to the data, China experienced a mean of 1.58 terrorist incidents per year with
a standard deviation of 1.83 incidents between 1995 and 2006. The average number of fatalities
was 7.25 (standard deviation of 24) and the mean number of injuries was 3.25 (standard
deviation of 9). China spent an average of $28.9 million50 and boasted a military composed of
3.6 to 4.1 million personnel during any given year. China scored above the worldwide 12 year
mean in monetary freedom, government size, and fiscal freedom. Freedom House reported low
scores for China in investment freedom, financial freedom, and property rights. Their average
GDP growth was an outstanding 9.46%; over 5% above the 12 year worldwide average. The
Chinese enjoyed a life expectancy 2 years above the worldwide mean. On average, 13 out of
100 citizens had a mobile phone and about 4 out of 100 were utilizing the internet; both are
below the worldwide mean for the 12 year timeframe.
Empirical Results
Tables 2 through 5 display the regression results. Fifteen models are included differing
by the use of fixed effects and the time frame analyzed. Models 1 though 7 include data from all
years, models 8 through 11 include data from 1995 to 2000, and models 8 to 15 include the data
from years 2001 to 2006. Fixed effect variables for nation and year were done separately
because when done in conjunction with one another, regression results were not possible.
Model 1 includes all social, economic, and political independent variables. In addition,
military might was measured in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Regression
results indicate only overall democracy increased the likelihood of terrorist incidents. In time
periods spanning 1995 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006, the coefficients indicate that there is a slightly
better than 50/50 chance of a terrorist incident when democracy increases by one unit.
Regressions in which democracy was expected to have an inverted “u” shape did not increase
goodness of fit values; therefore the better fitting linear model is reported. Most economic
indicators found a negative effect. That is, as nations increased in business, fiscal, monetary,
investment, and financial freedoms, fewer terrorist incidents took place in that nation.
Furthermore, political factors including property rights and freedom from corruption also
diminished the number of terrorist incidents. Mixed and majoritarian governmental systems did
not experience an increased likelihood of attack. In fact, their coefficient is negative, indicating
a slight inverse relationship. However, this variable is not significant. Military might, measured
by military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, was insignificant. Model 2 is similar to model
1 except it does not include any fixed effects. This model is used as a comparison to other
models using fixed effects.
Model 3 replaces model 1’s measure of military might with military expenditures as a
percentage of total government spending. In this model, military might is significant at the 10%
level. The relationship is positive, indicating that as military expenditures increase, terrorist
events increase as well; a causational relationship is unable to be established. Model 4 replaces
the fixed effects by nation with fixed effects by year. The year 2000 was omitted and is
therefore used as the reference year. The year 2000 was chosen because it stands in the middle
of the time frame, yet is before the historic year 2001. Therefore, the year 2000 would have
characteristics of 1995 and of 2006 but without the distortion caused by the terrorist events of
50
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2001. These variables attempt to negate the effect that omitted variables specific to the year may
introduce. The results are similar to those of model 1, in which political and economic
institutions have a negative effect. However, the strength of the relationships has diminished
slightly. Again, representation type and military might (measured as expenditures per GDP)
were not significant.
Model 5 is similar to model 4 except the measure of military might is military
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures. The results indicate that when
years are used as fixed effects, military might is not significant. Model 6 changes the measure of
military might again by utilizing data indicating the number of military personnel as a percentage
of the total labor force. Again, when the fixed effects for years are included, military might is
not significant. Model 7 includes a different measure of military might: the natural log of the
total number of military personnel. In this regression, military might is strongly and positively
significant (p<.001). The natural log form was used to reduce the amount of dispersion.
Table 3 represents regressions using data from only the years between 1995 and 2000.
This set was selected because it should not include the effects of 9/11 and subsequent defensive
and offensive strategies by nations and by terrorist groups. In all models the use of fixed effects
is relegated only to year variables; nation variable fixed effects were not possible. Model 8 finds
that military might as measured by expenditures as a percentage of GDP is significant. Again,
this relationship is positive and the coefficient indicates a probability greater than 50/50 of a
terrorist event occurring when military expenditures as a percentage of GDP increase by one
percentage. In all four models analyzing data between 1995 and 2000, mixed and majoritarian
government systems were positive and significant (p<.05). That is, government systems that
were not a pure parliamentary system were victim to more terrorist incidents.
Interestingly, the control variables of internet and mobile phone users per 100 people
were negative and strongly significant. Considering the years between 1995 and 2000, this
should be expected since internet and mobile phone use were not as prolific as they are today.
This may be a good indicator of a nations’ technological advancement.
Therefore,
technologically savvy nations experienced fewer terrorist incidents than their nontechnologically advanced counterparts. Models 9, 10, and 11 differ only in the manner they
measure military might. Significance was found in two out of the three models. Only the
variable that operationalized military might as military personnel in respect to the total
workforce is insignificant. Therefore, between the years of 1995 and 2000, military might and
terrorist events most likely shared a positive relationship.
Models 12, 13, 14, and 15 utilize data from the years between 2001 and 2006. Again,
only the fixed effects for years were utilized and, in these models, the year 2001 was used as the
comparison year. All four models found a negative relationship between government social
contribution and terrorist events. Model 12 indicates that economic factors including business
(p<.05), investment (p<.10), financial (p<.01), and GDP growth (p<.001) have a negative
relationship with terrorist incidents. The only political factor significant was freedom from
corruption and, as expected, the relationship is negative. Military might, measured by military
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, was not significant in this regression. Model 13 utilizes
military expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures to depict military might,
and again the relationship is not significant. Model 14 changes the measure of military might
again, but when military personnel as a percentage of total workforce is utilized, the relationship
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is significant and positive. Finally, model 15 finds a strong (p<.001) positive relationship
between military might, as measured by the natural log of total military personnel, and terrorist
incidents. In fact, according to the coefficient, if the log of military personnel increases by one,
the chance of a terrorist incident is almost twice as likely.
Findings
All hypotheses and the research question are addressed in this section.
Hypothesis 1: Nations that enjoy more economic freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to
terrorist incidents.
Nations that had greater business, investment, and trade freedoms had fewer terrorist
incidents. In most regressions, GDP growth had an inverse relationship with terrorist events. In
particular, the years after 2000 found a very strong relationship (p<.01) between GDP growth
and terrorist incidents. This may indicate that as we further the degree of globalization, tensions
may rise for those nations that are not progressing as quickly as others. One may conclude that
terrorists may feel a sense of relative deprivation. This conclusion is further emphasized when
the other economic indicators are considered. These finding suggest that economic freedoms
should be encouraged.
Hypothesis 2: Nations that enjoy more political freedoms will be less likely to fall victim to
terrorist incidents.
The degree of democracy, corruption, and property rights has influenced terrorist
incidents in varying degrees since 1995. Results considering the years of and between 1995 and
2006 prove that the overall democracy of a nation is positively related to number of terrorist
incidents in that nation. This finding is in accordance with previous research. The extent of
corruption is also strongly related to terrorist activity. Often, nations having less corrupt
governments will be rewarded with fewer terrorist incidents. Property rights may be considered
either political or economic. One may argue that the government offers property rights to
citizens either via legislation or judicial decision. In analyses considering all twelve years, those
nations that allowed greater property rights also enjoyed fewer terrorist incidents. Overall,
political freedoms play a strong role in deterring terrorist incidents, but democracy seems to
encourage terrorism. It should be remembered that these analyses utilize the target nation’s
terrorist incidents and not the nation that is the origin of the terrorist. Therefore, more
democratic nations may be targeted by terrorists. This conclusion is supported by Pape51 who
analyzed suicide terrorism. He argues that democratic nations concede to the wishes of terrorists
more easily than do non-democratic nations. The findings of this study furthers Pape’s argument
by indicating that, more so than just being democratic, nations that have a higher level of
democracy will face a greater likelihood of victimization by terrorists.
Hypothesis 3: A state’s military spending will have a negative effect on terrorism incidents in
that respective state.
Two indicators are used to measure military spending: military expenditures as a
percentage of GDP and as a percentage of total government expenditures. Both measures only
51
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found significance (p<.05 in both measures) in a positive direction in analyses considering the
years between 1995 and 2000. One may conclude that since 2001, military intervention has been
more effective than in the past, but its effect does not reduce the number of terrorist incidents.
This is contrary to the notions of many politicians and American citizens.
Hypothesis 4: The magnitude of a state’s military workforce is negatively related to the number
of terrorist incidents
Military might is operationalized by using two personnel indicators: military personnel as
a percentage of total labor force and the natural log of military personnel. Results indicate that
the natural log of military personnel is very positively and significantly (p<.001) related to
terrorist incidents. When the years between 2001 and 2006 are considered, military personnel as
a percentage of total labor force found a positive and significant (p<.05) relationship with
terrorist incidents. These results indicate that military force increases the chance of terrorist
incidents. Although the military may enhance security, they induce a greater number of terrorist
events.
Hypothesis 5: Nations having a majoritarian or mixed political system will be positively related
to the number of terrorist incidents
Pure parliamentary systems between 1995 and 2000 enjoyed fewer incidents. As
Lijphart52 argues, parliamentary systems may have offered adequate representation and, thereby,
stability. Unfortunately, this finding is relegated only to the years of 1995 to 2000. All other
analyses indicated that representation did not reduce the number of terrorist events. One may
conclude that the years after 2001 experienced a greater terrorist force that overcame any
stabilizing effects that pure parliamentary systems offered.
Research Question: Can the economic, social and political institutions affect the likelihood of a
terrorist event in a nation?
The frequency of terrorist incidents is strongly related to political and economic
institutions. Political factors constitute a significant portion of a nation’s political institutions.
Stronger political institutions will, most likely, result in fewer terrorist events and, in a more
general sense, offer citizens a stable government and society. But government alone cannot
reduce terrorist incidents. Economic institutions are vital for a society. The analysis of this and
other research studies prove that this is true.
In addition to the economic and political institutions, social institutions should also be
recognized. In an effort to quantify the social institutions in a nation, government’s social
contribution was included as a variable. This monetary indicator found significance between the
years of 2001 and 2006, indicating that the government’s ability to help solve social problems is
becoming more crucial in a post-9/11 world. But social institutions include more than merely
government welfare programs. The culture and social dynamics of a nation are encapsulated in
social institutions. Therefore, social institutions affect the financial and political environment of
nation. Societies having social institutions that regard economic and political freedoms should
enjoy fewer terrorist incidents. Military might in its various forms of measurement was found
counter-productive, which exemplifies the crucial role of institutions. Moreover, the effects of
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political, economic and social institutions are not mutually exclusive; instead they are
intertwined. Therefore, effective policy must address all three institutions.
Limitations
The current study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research.
First is the imprecision of data sources. The dependent variable, terrorist incidents by nation per
year, was acquired from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base53. The database does not include all
terrorist incidents, only those that were reported by media outlets. Some incidents did not get
media attention and were therefore omitted. This non-random measurement error should be
congruent throughout, but future research should attempt to gain more accurate records.
Independent variables acquired from Freedom House54 can be flawed since evaluations
that create the index are subjective. Although Freedom House prides itself on methodological
techniques, in essence these measures are questionable. Currently, Freedom House is one of the
most widely used sources of political data, but future research should attempt to find more
objective instruments.
This study utilized data from 1995 to 2006, a twelve year period involving 1,980
observations from 165 nations. Although the analysis includes a significant period of time, the
indicators utilized in this study should be applied to larger time periods to gain a better
perspective on terrorism. That is, if political, economic, and social factors impact terrorist
events, they should do so in any time period. Ideally, researchers should attempt to include a
time period greater than three decades. Yet, the greatest obstacle is gaining trustworthy data
from all nations over this time frame.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
In general, policies should seek more effective government, free economic markets, and
encourage a society to become stable. Considering the vast array of government types and
cultures of the 165 nations analyzed in this study, the aforementioned goals will be formidable.
The answer may lie in custom tailored policy devised by each nation. The U.S. has an incentive
to encourage nations to be democratic and capitalistic, yet depending on culture and existing
economic conditions, this type of policy may be detrimental. Developing and developed nations
should differ in policy initiatives. Developing nations should put greater resources into
eliminating corruption and harnessing the people’s trust. They should balance their economic
growth with policy regulating oppressive business practices. These nations should seek U.N.
coordination to assist in creating and implementing progressive policies.
Developed nations, such as China, should seek to reduce any existing corruption and
encourage greater civic participation. Economic practices should be evaluated and unnecessary
regulations that stifle growth should be removed; although, trust in the invisible hand should be
tempered with caution. Governmental leaders should strive to inculcate a culture that embodies
the government’s effectiveness. To accomplish this, policies should reflect the will of the
people. Legislators, judges and executive leaders should put their own agendas aside for the
53
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greater good. It is with societal stability that terrorism will be controlled; this conclusion is
evident in this study’s results.
In more democratic nations security is critical. Resources should be devoted to target
hardening and border security. The tradeoff between civil liberties and security should be
considered when adjusting security regulations. In a broad sense, the benefit from security
should not exceed the cost to society. This is a difficult equilibrium to establish. The optimum
level of security will not offer absolute protection. In fact, absolute security would be much too
costly and infeasible. Allowing feedback from the public and accepting that some terrorist
incidents will occur should assist in determining this point.
In conclusion, terrorist activity can be controlled and possibly eliminated if political,
economic, and social conditions are correct. Terrorism is not the disease; merely a symptom.
More secure buildings, airports, and borders only assist in preventing terrorism and have the
potential of causing more harm than good. In accordance with security, policies should focus on
preventing a belief that terrorism is a viable answer to changing a government or ideology. To
accomplish this, the institutions of a society must be addressed. Foreign influence is likely to
have unfavorable outcomes but may be necessary in extreme circumstances in an effort to regain
control. Garth Evans55 of the Crisis Group offers 8 suggestions to all nations aspiring to reduce
terrorism.
1) “The best way to prevent deadly conflict is not to start one:” Military
intervention should be avoided and used only as a last resort.
2) “Conflict prevention effort does make a difference:” The use of international
governmental and economic institutions, such as the UN, can offer productive
assistance to embattled nations.
3) “One size analysis doesn’t fit all- every conflict is different:” Overarching
theories do not reflect the conflict; instead comprehensively understanding the
dynamics in each nation is necessary in effective policy changes.
4) “Conflict is cyclical- the trick is to stop the wheel turning:” Institutions
should be created and designed to assist a nation in addressing post-conflict
disagreements non-violently.
5) “Conflict prevention requires complex strategies- one dimensional fixes rarely
work:” Managing conflicts requires an in-depth knowledge of a nation’s complex
dynamics; therefore, policy should address the many aspects involved.
6) “Conflict prevention requires effective institutional structures:”
regional and national governments should focus on conflict prevention.

Global,

7) “Conflict prevention requires application of resources:” Resources (monetary
and human) should be allotted effectively and efficiently in an effort to promote
stability.
55
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8) “Conflict prevention requires political will:” The nation’s government and
leaders must embody a conflict prevention stance.
His advice is supported by the findings of this study and offers an excellent vision for future
foreign and domestic policy.
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